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Summary: For many experts the true motivation behind the introduction of a
single currency in Europe is political rather than economic. This view is based
on the fact that the euro area does not constitute an optimal currency area and,
therefore, the costs of monetary integration are likely to outweigh the benefits.
In particular, the loss of control over monetary policy and exchange rates make 
overcoming asymmetric demand-side shocks very painful. Moreover, the mon-
etary union lacks a common fiscal authority that could help in smoothing out
business cycles. The present crisis exposed these vulnerabilities and, unfortu-
nately, so far economic policies adopted in the region have failed to rectify
these shortcomings.
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Numerous economists, for instance, David E. W. Laidler (1991), Martin Feldstein 
(1997), Paul De Grauwe (2000), and Ben S. Bernanke (2005), claim that the Euro-
pean monetary union is rather a political than an economic endeavor. This conclusion 
originates in the fact that the countries admitted to the union do not meet the criteria 
of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory (Barry Eichengreen 1992; and Michael 
Artis, Marion Kohler, and Jacques Mélitz 1998) as spelled out in Robert A. Mundell 
(1961), Ronald I. McKinnon (1963), and Peter B. Kenen (1969). If nations that form a 
monetary union do not form an OCA, then the costs related to the loss of control over 
monetary policy and exchange rates may outweigh the benefits resulting from the 
elimination of foreign exchange risk (greater volume of trade and closer economic 
integration). 
Vaclav Klaus (2004) quotes numerous politicians openly admitting that the 
monetary union is a political act. Similarly, a former European Union ambassador to 
the United States, stated that “[i]f an underlying rationale for the Economic and 
Monetary Union [EMU] was economic, the deepest reason for such a move was pro-
foundly political” and added that it was designed to “strengthen Europe’s voice in the 
world (Günter Burghardt 2005, pp. 24-25).” 
 
1. Asymmetric Shocks 
 
Potential economic costs to a monetary union may be particularly high in the face of 
adverse asymmetric demand-side shocks, i.e. disturbances that affect only certain 
industries or geographic regions, like the present financial crisis. The relative under- 
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performance of the euro area (17 countries), as compared to that of the United States, 
presents some evidence that the establishment of a single currency hamstrung the 
European economy (Table 1). These developments simply confirm trends that have 
been in place since the very beginning of monetary integration (Kazimierz Dadak 
2008, see also Figure 1). 
 
Table 1   GDP Growth (%) 
 
Country 2008  2009  2010  2011*  2012* 
Euro area (17)  0.4  -4.3  1.8  1.6  1.8 
Greece** 1.0  -2.0  -4.5  -3.5  1.1 
Ireland -3.0  -7.0  -0.4  0.6  1.9 
Italy -1.3  -5.2  1.3  1.0  1.3 
Portugal 0.0  -2.5  1.3  -2.2  -1.8 
Spain 0.9  -3.7  -0.1  0.8  1.5 
USA -0.3  -3.5  3.0  2.6  2.7 
 
Note: * Forecasts; ** Provisional data. 
Source: Eurostat (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2011)1 and Eurostat (2011)2.
 
Figure 1 Euroland and USA, Inflation and Growth (Annual Average, %) 
 
 
Kenen (1969), Paul Krugman (1993) and De Grauwe (2000), among others, 
stress that a high degree of labor mobility and, what is now called “fiscal federal-
ism”, are very helpful in overcoming harmful effects of asymmetric shocks. 
 
                                                        
1 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2011. StatExtracts. 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx (accessed September 2, 2011). 
2 Eurostat. 2011. Statistics. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database 
(accessed September 3, 2011). 
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The Commission of the European Communities (1990) notes that the Ameri-
can labor market is much more flexible than its European counterpart. Similarly, Paul 
R. Masson and Mark P. Taylor (1993) show that the mobility of labor within Germa-
ny is much lower than the mobility of this resource across the United States. Moreo-
ver, they reach a conclusion that labor mobility among the European Union nations is 
lower than among the German Länder. 
Countries that formed a monetary union must be “armed with a wide array of 
budgetary policies to deal with the stubborn ‘pockets of unemployment’ that are cer-
tain to arise from export fluctuations combined with an imperfect mobility of labor 
(Kenen 1969, p. 54).” But, the European Commission collects a tiny fraction of all 
taxes and has extremely limited ability to respond to economic challenges in general 
and asymmetric shocks in particular. Therefore, Michael M. Hutchison and Kenneth 
M. Kletzer (1995), Tamim Bayoumi and Masson (1998), and Michael D. Bordo and 
Harold James (2008) stress this major weakness of the European project. Automatic 
stabilizers can be helpful in overcoming asymmetric shocks, too. Xavier Sala-i-
Martin and Jeffrey Sachs (1992) and Masson and Taylor (1993) find this to be true 
for, respectively, the United States and Canada. 
On the other hand, Jeffrey A. Frankel and Andrew K. Rose (1996) argue that 
countries that ex ante do not constitute an OCA could become one. They find that an 
increase in trade may lead to more highly correlated business cycles. This, in turn, 
better insulates members of a monetary union from the harmful effects of asymmetric 
shocks. In sum, a country that on the basis of past experiences may be a poor candi-
date for entry into a monetary union ex post may meet the OCA criteria. 
 
2. Maastricht Criteria 
 
The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) established, among other things, 
the limits on annual budget deficits and total national debts, as well as, a central bank 
completely independent of any national or European Union (EU) authorities. 
The 3 percent maximum annual budget deficit and the total debt ceiling equal 
to 60 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were later confirmed in the 1997 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Moreover, the SGP envisaged very severe penalties 
for the violation of the above principles, especially regarding the budget deficit level. 
Peter Bofinger (2003), Willem Buiter et al. (1993), De Grauwe (2000), and Eichen-
green (2003), among others, show that the restrictions have no theoretical basis, 
however. 
 The degree of European Central Bank’s (ECB) sovereignty is without 
precedent (Forrest Capie 1998). Moreover, the bank has to accomplish a single pri-
mary goal—price stability (Council of the European Union 2010a, art. 127). Pascal 
Lamy and Jean Pisani-Ferry (2002) reveal that from the very beginning the ECB 
made every use of its statutory independence and refused any outside influence. This 
makes any synchronization of fiscal and monetary policies very difficult. However, 
Kenen (1969) argues that an area possessing a common currency should have a sin-
gle authority to tax and spend, to make sure that a policy mix is optimal, i.e. assures 
full employment. Andrew Hughes Hallett (2005) confirms that policy coordination 
can lead to a faster rate of economic growth and lower unemployment without higher 
inflation.  
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3. The Euro’s First Decade 
 
Europe’s economic performance over the first decade offers a mixed picture. A pro-
ponent proclaims that “the euro has been an undisputed success (Joaquin Almunia 
2009, p. 17).” Menzie D. Chinn and Frankel (2008) predict that the currency may 
soon displace the American dollar as the most important reserve currency. McKinnon 
(2004) also notes a very significant decrease in the rate of inflation across the mem-
ber nations and the resulting decline in interest rates. 
Nevertheless, these encouraging events did not suffice to promote more in-
vestment spending and, consequently, to stimulate an increase in the rate of econom-
ic growth. In the decade preceding the establishment of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
euro area and the United States were growing at a very close rate, but beginning with 
the convergence period their growth rates have diverged (Figure 1). In 1999-2006 
“the countries in the Euro zone exhibited significantly lower growth rates … than the 
remaining OECD countries (Thushyanthan Baskaran 2009, p. 351).” 
Moreover, the monetary union failed to deliver another critical benefit, namely 
significantly more trade among its members and a greater degree of economic inte-
gration. Richard Baldwin (2006) found that the introduction of the common currency 
resulted only in a small, one time spurt in trade of between 5 and 10 percent. As the 
deepening of trade relations failed to materialize, the anticipated by De Grauwe 
(2000) convergence of European economies did not take place or progressed at a 
much slower pace. Consequently, the entire euro area fell short of becoming more 
economically similar and, thus, less vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. This develop-
ment also casts a doubt on the endogeneity of OCA hypothesis put forth by Frankel 
and Rose (1996). 
 
4. European Union’s Response to the Crisis 
 
The response of the European Union to the current crisis has been selective. On one 
hand, Hungary, a country that joined the EU, but not the monetary union, was denied 
any support; it had to call on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. Simi-
larly, Poland obtained a credit line from this multilateral organization rather than 
from the European Union. On the other hand, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, all euro 
area members, received financial assistance from other Euroland members, despite 
the alleged Maastricht no-bailout clause. 
Consequently, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) was 
founded in May of 2010 (Council of the European Union 2010b). This initiative re-
sulted in the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
(Council of the European Union 2010c), a corporation with total financial resources 
equal to 440 billion euros. This facility can be augmented with up to 60 billion raised 
by the European Commission and up to 250 billion from the IMF (European Finan-
cial Stability Facility 2011). The structure of the bailout mechanism shows that the 
European Union is either reluctant or incapable of acting on its own, because as 
much a third of the aid is funded by the IMF.  
In mid-2013 this facility will be replaced with a permanent crisis management 
tool, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with a total subscribed capital of 700  
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billion euros (European Council 2011). An important feature of this new program is 
that it will lend money exclusively to the euro area member-states on the basis of “a 
stringent programme of economic and fiscal adjustment and on a rigorous debt sus-
tainability analysis conducted by the European Commission and the IMF, in liaison 
with the ECB (Council of the European Union 2010d).” In sum, the idea to make the 
European Union a “transfer union” was quickly quashed (The Economist 2010). 
Therefore, the prospects for further fiscal integration and the overcoming of well-
known shortcomings of the monetary union in this respect are dim. 
The Board of Governors of ESM will include only representatives of the Eu-
roland. The European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the 
President of the ECB will serve only as observers. Moreover, the voting power of a 
governor will be proportional to his or her member state’s contribution to the ESM. 
This is an evident departure from the usual voting procedures within the European 
Union, which offer protections to smaller countries; for instance, every member of 
the euro area appoints one director to the ECB’s Board of Directors and each director 
enjoys the same voting privileges. 
The efforts to overcome the effects of the crisis also demonstrate the limits to 
the European Union; the institution has no significant financial resources of its 
own—of the 750 billion euro-large EFSF only 60 billion euros come from Brussels. 
The ESM is a product of the Eurogroup, a committee composed only of 
finance ministers of the euro area. This entity is not listed as a governing body in any 
of the European Union treaties; nevertheless, it earned a blessing of the European 
Commission (2008, pp. 287-293). The recognition of the Eurogroup may strengthen 
the euro externally in line with suggestions made by, for instance, Benjamin J. Cohen 
(2011), but its existence adds to the complexity of economic governance within the 
European Union. Moreover, this development is in stark contrast to other efforts to 
bring all members of the European Union into a closer alliance, in particular the Lis-
bon Treaty, which produced a president and a foreign minister for the entire region 
(Council of the European Union 2007). 
 
5. Economic Policies Adopted to Overcome the Crisis 
 
A visible feature of the current European approach to the crisis is the insistence on 
strict adherence to criteria enshrined in the SGP. But, economists point to numerous 
shortcomings of the Pact and make various proposals to change it, especially to make 
it more flexible. An excellent overview of that discussion can be found, for instance, 
in Iain Begg and Waltraud Schelkle (2004) and Antonio Fatás et al. (2003). 
The European leaders’ approach seems to be rooted in the “German view” of 
fiscal policy, which challenges the standard Keynesian position that a decrease in 
government spending has a negative effect on aggregate demand; instead it stresses 
the negative impact of budget deficits on total demand (Francesco Giavazzi and Mar-
co Pagano 1990). Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) claim that Denmark and Ireland at-
tained much better economic performance after the nations substantially lowered 
budget deficits and they called these events “expansionary fiscal consolidations 
(EFC).” The logic behind EFC is that decreasing deficits produces expectations of 
lower taxes and higher incomes and, consequently, increases private consumption 
and, thus, prevents a contraction in aggregate demand.  
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However, Michael U. Bergman and Michael M. Hutchison (1999) analyze 15 
cases of significant fiscal consolidations that occurred in the OECD countries in 
1975-95 and found that most countries that adopted such polices underwent reces-
sions, and in only three instance the expansion was associated with a strong increase 
in consumption (Denmark, Ireland and Sweden). As far as the Danish case is con-
cerned, the authors observed that other elements played an even more important role, 
in particular favorable terms of trade and supply-side and cyclical factors. Moreover, 
they note that the upswing was short-lived, after three years the Danish economy 
suffered sharp downturn. Regarding Ireland, “buoyant world demand, improvements 
in cost competitiveness, and an inflow of foreign investment… more than out-
weighed the short-run contractionary effects of fiscal contraction (Frank G. Barry 
and Michael B. Devereux 1995, pp. 260-261).” 
Hughes Hallett and Peter McAdam (1998) and Gabriele Giudice, Alessandro 
Turrini, and Jan in’ t Veld (2003) emphasize the importance of a proper policy mix; 
contractionary fiscal policy must be combined with accommodating monetary policy. 
Furthermore, “sufficiently strong trend growth of real GDP is a necessary condition 
for the sustainability of public finances in EMU (Giudice, Turrini, and in’ t Veld 
2003, p. 52). ”It is extremely difficult to imagine that any of these conditions could 
be met in the euro area under present conditions. Additionally, Alberto Alesina and 
Roberto Perotti (1996) postulate that reductions in government spending, as opposed 
to those that aim at enhancing revenue, are much more likely to result in a lasting 
improvement in macroeconomic performance. But all drastic reductions in budget 
deficits presently enacted in the Euroland involve tax increases. 
The polices currently adopted in the euro area also go against the opinion of 
an overwhelming majority of American economists who believe that in times of ma-
jor economic slowdown expansionary fiscal policy has a “significant stimulative im-
pact” (Richard M. Alston, J. R. Kearl, and Michael B. Vaughn 1992, p. 204). Simi-
larly, Philip Arestis (2011) shows that fiscal policy is a crucial factor that affects 
economic performance. Alan S. Blinder and Mark Zandi (2010) believe that the sti-
mulus package adopted by the Obama administration in 2009 saved the United States 
from another Great Depression. Marco Ratto, Werner Roeger, and in’ t Veld (2006) 
find that in the euro area not only automatic stabilizers, but also discretionary fiscal 
policy is effective in stabilizing GDP. 
On the other hand, so far, the policy of reinforcing SGP has disappointed on 
some fundamental metrics. Arestis and Theodore Pelagidis (2010) point to the like-
lihood that the austerity policies may eventually force some of the EMU countries to 
default on their debts. As a matter of fact, the fourth review of economic progress in 
Greece revealed that the actual budget deficit in all of 2010 was 1 percent higher than 
had been previously estimated (European Commission 2011). In the first quarter of 
2011 Greece experienced further deterioration in government finances and “the ESA-
based deficit for the year as a whole would be in excess of 10 percent of GDP, vir-
tually the same of 2010 (European Commission 2011, p. 25)” as opposed to the 
planned 7.5 percent shortfall. Consequently, last July economic ministers of the euro 
area were forced to adopt a new bailout plan for Greece (Laurence Norman and Na-
thalie Boschat 2011). Eurostat (2011) predicts that, with the exception of Ireland in  
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2012, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal will grow at rates below the Euroland’s average 
(Table 1).  
Also, monetary stimulus in Europe is small, compared to that in the United 
States. The Fed has to achieve both stable prices and full employment, while the 
Maastrich Treaty charges the ECB with just the former goal (Patricia S. Pollard 
2003). Therefore, the Fed enjoys much greater flexibility in addressing demand-side 
economic shocks and it takes full advantage of this freedom. On the other hand, al-
ready in the early stage of this crisis the ECB proclaimed that it “remains strongly 
committed to preventing second-round effects and the materialisation of upside risks 
to price stability over the medium term” in spite of expected slow economic growth 
and “uncertainty about the prospects for economic growth [being] unusually high 
(Jean-Claude Trichet 2008).” In April of 2011 the central bank increased interest 
rates at the very first sign of economic rebound (Trichet and Vitor Constâncio 2011). 
 
6. Market Reactions 
 
So far, actions undertaken by the Europeans have had a very limited impact, if any. 
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland are unable to reenter financial markets; yields on long-
term bonds issued by these countries remain at levels that are not sustainable. Figure 
2 shows that market rates on 10-year government bonds sold by these countries have 
increased following the rescue packages. Similarly, yields on long-term Italian and 
Spanish bonds have substantially crept up since October of 2010. On the other hand, 
borrowing costs of the United Kingdom and Sweden, nations that decided not to join 
the euro area, have remained relatively very low and close to those of Germany, the 
euro area’s benchmark (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2011). 
 
Figure 1 Yield on Long-Term Sovereign Bonds (Monthly Average, %) 
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Overall, the crisis shows beyond any doubt that it is not membership in a 
monetary union, but the creditworthiness of a borrower that determines the cost of 
funds. Major rating agencies keep cutting down the ratings on sovereign debt issued 
by Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, as well as that of Italy and Spain. Similarly, a ma-
jority of European economists predict that Greece and Ireland will default on their 
obligations (Andrew Walker 2011). Consequently, none of the nations that received 
funds from the EFSF and committed itself to intense austerity measures has managed 
to lower its borrowing costs. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Many economists claim that the monetary union in Europe is a political rather than 
an economic enterprise, because the region does not meet OCA requirements, has 
low labor mobility and lacks a central fiscal authority. For these reasons, the euro 
area is prone to asymmetric demand-side shocks and lacks effective defenses against 
such adverse developments, except for deflation. The current crisis in several mem-
ber-states, especially in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal supports these views and casts 
a shadow over the future of the euro. 
The steps that the leaders of the euro area undertook to address the present cri-
sis show that the region lacks political unity. The proposed ESM is designed to be an 
emergency facility; its funds will be disbursed only under very strict conditions and 
exclusively to members of the euro area. Consequently, in breach of European soli-
darity, the European Union is divided into two economic tiers, the euro area and the 
rest. The governance of ESM is based solely on economic power of a member-state. 
The position of the European Commission and, especially, of the European Parlia-
ment is weakened; it is the individual state that wields power. Moreover, the mechan-
ism cannot be used to turn the region into a transfer union and, thus, make it more 
cohesive and competitive. 
Financial markets are leery about the prospects for success in attaining finan-
cial stability in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal and, consequently, interest rates that the 
nations are expected to offer on loans are prohibitively high. Moreover, yields on 
sovereign debt offered by some other euro area members have drifted upwards. Simi-
larly, rating agencies keep downgrading debt issued by the periphery. Therefore, the 
prospects for a quick economic recovery remain dim. 
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